Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs by Ida, Ferrara & Paul, Missios
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Transboundary Renewable Resource
Management: A Dynamic Game with
Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs
Ferrara Ida and Missios Paul
York University, Ryerson University
19 August 1996
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70749/
MPRA Paper No. 70749, posted 16 April 2016 16:43 UTC
TRANSBOUNDARY RENEWABLE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: A DYNAMIC GAME WITH
DIFFERING NON-COOPERATIVE PAYOFFS
Ida Ferrara,
Department of Economics,
York University
and
Paul C. Missios,
Department of Economics,
York University
Revised August 19th, 1996
Abstract: Recent conicts over sh stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived pub-
lic interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given
that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-
enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model
is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries
may enjoy di¤ering economic payo¤s. The predictions of the model are consistent with and
provide insights into the particulars of the recent disputes.
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Transboundary Renewable Resource Management:A Dynamic Game With Dif-
fering Non-Cooperative Payo¤s*
1. Introduction
Recent conicts between Canada and the United States over Pacic salmon and between Canada
and the European Union (EU) over turbot have revived public interest in the optimal manage-
ment of jointly exploited renewable resources. Whether cooperation or non-cooperation between
the countries involved in any such conict is more desirable has been previously analyzed in
theory, with the nding that the cooperative solution Pareto-dominates the non-cooperative
outcome, given that under cooperation the externality, or common property resource aspect, is
fully taken into account in the choice of the optimal total harvest. This result is not necessarily
inconsistent with the recurring of sh wars (non-cooperation) in a world of utility-maximizing
agents, as non-cooperative outcomes are often short-lived and result in negotiated settlements
preferable over competition to all parties. In the literature on cooperative free-access shery
models, the article by Gordon Munro (1979) and that by Jon Vislie (1987) are the most relevant
to the present paper, even though our emphasis will be on the second one. Gordon Munro,
in his pivotal 1979 article, considers two countries exploiting a transboundary sh stock under
the assumption of a binding cooperative agreement and Nash bargaining.1 Jon Vislie, in his
1987 comment on Munros article, relaxes the restrictive requirement that the two countries are
legally bound to their commitments concerning future actions, and uses a simplied (two-period)
version of Munros model to examine the scenario where the contract between the countries must
1Plourde and Yeung (1989) examine binding cooperative agreements like Munro (1979) but with n  2 players.
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be self-enforcing. Notwithstanding its contributions, Vislies analysis depends on the unrealistic
assumption that the breakdown (no-agreement) payo¤s to the countries are the same, implying
an equal division of the nal-period harvest. Indeed, the country adjacent to the sh stock may
have better information regarding the best shing spots or some other advantage which would
lead to a non-cooperative payo¤ higher than that of the other country.2 Furthermore, Vislies
results would apply to the above mentioned Canadian conicts, in particular the one over tur-
bot, only if Canada has a lower discount rate than the European Union, that is, only if Canada
is more future-oriented. By allowing for di¤ering breakdown payo¤s, we are able to show that
the second-period share for the country with the higher payo¤, denoted the Home country,3 is
greater than fty percent. This is intuitively appealing, as the country that gains more from
non-cooperation must be compensated with a higher share under cooperation. We then derive
the e¤ects of di¤ering second-period shares on the rst-period shares, as well as on the rst- and
second-period harvests, and, nally, compare the predictions of the model with the reality of the
current turbot and salmon disputes. The model can be applicable to both situations in which
the stock migrates across the boundary between the waters of two nations, and those in which
the stock migrates between the waters of one nation and the high seas (straddling stocks),
the latter only when there are two countries and barriers to entry.
2Another explanation of di¤ering non-cooperative payo¤s is that the harvesting cost functions of the two
countries may be di¤erent. We thank an anonymous referee for mentioning this possibility. For simplicity,
however, we assume that di¤erences in breakdown payo¤s arise for reasons other than costs, and therefore
assume identical cost functions.
3The Home country is assumed to have a higher payo¤ in each period due to its geographic proximity to
the sh resource and, as a result, to the advantage of more diverse technologies. The Foreign country can only
employ o¤shore technologies that must incorporate both the harvesting and the processing (e.g. canning or
freezing) of the sh caught. Homeand Foreignare used throughout the paper for ease of exposition, to more
clearly di¤erentiate between the country with the higher non-cooperative payo¤ from the country with the lower
non-cooperative payo¤. The model presented remains applicable to the management of stocks between countries
equally distant from the stock, as long as one country has a higher breakdown payo¤ than the other, as can be
witnessed in the Canada-U.S. dispute over particular salmon species.
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The material covered in this paper is organized in four sections. In section 2 we show that the
Home country receives a second-period share of the total harvest greater than that of the other
country, denoted the Foreign country. In section 3 we present a two-period model of the type
used by Vislie but with the additional requirement that the results derived in section 2 hold,
namely, that the second-period shares are more than fty percent for the Home country and,
accordingly, less than fty percent for the Foreign country. In section 4 we relate the predictions
of the model to the current disputes and draw implications for present and future actions on
the part of both countries involved in these conicts. In section 5 we o¤er concluding remarks
and comment on the contribution of the paper to the management of joint-access renewable
resources.
2. The Second-Period Sharing Rule
Following Munro and Vislie, we consider two countries facing a world demand for harvested sh
that is innitely elastic, implying a constant price, p, and an identical unit cost of harvesting
in any period t that is dependent only upon the sh stock, x, at the beginning of the same
period, C(xt 1). In a bargaining situation where agreements are not juridically binding, the
two countries maximize in each period the Nash-product,4 that is, the product of their individual
gains from cooperation, such that their harvest shares (both non-negative) sum to unity, and
4See Nash (1953) for the proofs of the desirable properties of the Nash-product (feasibility, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, Pareto-optimality, rationality, and symmetry). Recently, there has been some debate over
the validity of the Nash Bargaining Solution and the Nash-product as self-enforcing. For alternative views in the
sheries literature, see Kaitala and Pohjola (1988) or Armstrong (1994).
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subject to the resource constraint
xt = xt 1 + F (xt 1)  ht  x; (2.1)
where F (xt 1) is the natural growth function, ht is the total harvest in period t, and x is some
critical stock level. Under the assumption that the second-period non-cooperative payo¤ of the
Home country, v, is larger than that of the Foreign country, w, the Nash-product for that period
is given by
[a2(p  C(x1))h2   v][(1  a2)(p  C(x1))h2   w]; (2.2)
where a2 is the second-period harvest share of the Home country. Maximization of (2.2) with
respect to a2, under the assumption that the sh stock at the end of the second period is equal
to the critical level, yields
a2 =
1
2
+
(v   w)
2h2[p  C(x1)] ; (2.3)
which is obviously greater than one-half. In the following section we take this result into account
when determining the rst-period sharing rule and the sh stock to be left unharvested in the
rst period.
3. A Dynamically Consistent Two-Period Agreement
The countries negotiate the agreement at the beginning of the rst period by maximizing the
two-period Nash-product,
(V a   V 0)(W a  W 0); (3.1)
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where
V a = a1[p  C(x0)](x0 + F (x0)  x1) + a2bH [p  C(x1)](x1 + F (x1)  x); (3.2)
W a = (1  a1)[p  C(x0)](x0 + F (x0)  x1) + (1  a2)bF [p  C(x1)](x1 + F (x1)  x); (3.3)
and V 0 and W 0 are the present values of payo¤s under no agreement,5 and where bH is the
discount factor for the Home country and bF is the discount factor for the Foreign country.
However, unless a2 in (3.2) and (3.3) is determined according to (2.3), the contract will not be
self-enforcing and the countries will have an incentive to deviate from the negotiated shares.
Under the constraints that a1 ranges between zero and one, and that the sh stock at the
beginning of the second period is not less than the critical level, the solution to the above
maximization problem must satisfy
f[p  C(x0)]h1g(W a  W 0)  f[p  C(x0)]h1g(V a   V 0) = 0 (3.4)
and
a1[p  C(x0)] + bH
2
fC 0(x1)h2   [p  C(x1)][1 + F 0(x1)]gg(W a  W 0) (3.5)
= f (1  a1)[p  C(x0)] + bF
2
f C 0(x1)h2 + [p  C(x1)][1 + F 0(x1)]gg(V a   V 0)
5As discussed in the Introduction, V 0 is assumed to be greater than W 0:
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From (3.4), using (3.5) and substituting for a2, we obtain
a1 =
1
2
+
[(1  a2)bF   a2bH ][p  C(x1)]h2 + (V 0  W 0)
(bH + bF )f C 0(x1)h2 + [p  C(x1)][1 + F 0(x1)]gh1 ; (3.6)
which gives the rst-period harvest share for the Home country as a function of, among other
variables, the second-period shares. Further, we nd that the optimal level of x1,6 which is
implicit in (3.5), depends only upon the two discount factors, the price, and the initial and
critical stock levels, and is therefore independent of the harvest shares.7 The immediate result
of this independence is that the assumption of di¤ering non-cooperative payo¤s has no impact
on the choice of the optimal rst- and second-period harvests, however, it does have an e¤ect
on that of the rst- and second-period shares.
From (3.6), we know that a1 is greater than fty percent in situations where the two countries
have identical discount rates, i.e., bH = bF = b  0. In fact, substituting for a2 in the numerator
of the second term on the right-hand-side of (3.6), denoted A, we have
A = (V 0  W 0)  b(v   w); (3.7)
which is greater than zero, given that it is simply the di¤erence between the rst-period no-
agreement payo¤ of the Home country and that of the Foreign country, and, by assumption,
that di¤erence is positive in any period.8 For di¤ering discount factors, specically bH > bF ,
6The choice variables are in actuality a1 and h1. However, h1 is a function of the initial sh stock, which is
given, and x1, so that the countries choose the optimal h1 by maximizing with respect to x1.
7 (3.5) also includes the marginal stock e¤ect described by Clark (1976), in which the countries both have
an incentive to reduce their current harvest as this will result in a higher stock level and thus lower harvesting
costs in the following period due to the assumption of C0(x) > 0.
8The denominator of the second term on the right-hand-side of (3.6) is equal to 2[p   C(x0)]h1, from (3.5),
and is clearly positive.
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implying that the Home country is more future- or conservation-oriented, we know that a1 is
lower than in the previous case where bH = bF ,9 but we cannot say whether a1 is less or greater
than fty percent, since
A = (V 0  W 0) + 1
2
(bF   bH)[p  C(x1)]h2   1
2
(bH + bF )(v   w); (3.8)
the sign of which is ambiguous because of an additional negative term (the second term on
the right-hand-side) and depends on the magnitude of the Home countrys non-cooperative
advantage over the Foreign country (v   w). In particular, the larger the present value of the
Home countrys non-cooperative payo¤ relative to that of the Foreign country, the more likely
the Home country will have a larger cooperative harvest share (more than fty percent) not only
in the second period but also in the rst period under a cooperative agreement.
To better illustrate the above results, we can assume that the two countriesdefault payo¤s
are constant over time, implying that V 0 = v + bHv and W 0 = w + bFw, and, using the
equilibrium value of a2 from (2.3), we can rewrite (3.8) as
A = (v   w) + (bF   bH)[(1  a2)v   a2w]
(2a2   1) : (3.9)
We then have that, if bF = bH , a1 is greater than one-half as A = v   w > 0, and, if bF >
bH , whether a1 is greater than one-half depends upon the di¤erence between v and w, which,
according to (2.3), also determines by how much a2 exceeds fty percent.
9The derivative of a1 with respect to bH is negative, and that with respect to bF is positive.
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4. Applications to Current Disputes: The Pacic Salmon and Turbot
Cases
Both Munro and Vislie recognize that conicts in the management of transboundary renewable
resources may arise from di¤erences in perceptions of the social rate of discount or rate of time
preference.10 However, in reality, disputes do occur even between countries such as Canada and
the United States, which can be considered to have identical discount rates because of similar
social, cultural, political, and economic infrastructures. Of interest in the current context,
is the Canada-US salmon dispute, which goes back more than a century, with the rst formal
agreement, the Bryce-Root Treaty of 1908, governing only the Fraser river sockeye run of British
Columbia. Later arrangements extended management coverage to other major salmon species,
the Fraser pinks, and the Washington- and Oregon-spawned cohos and chinooks. In spite of
these treaties, mismanagement and overshing occurred to the point of near extinction for
many commercially important spawning runs in both Canada and the United States. In fact,
in response to Bill Clintons decision to ban salmon shing in the area from California to the
Canadian border where the stocks were badly depleted, and to the resulting US shermens
resolution to travel to Alaska, adding to the pressure on the salmon originating in BC, the
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans instructed Canadian shermen to aggressively
sh the Fraser river in order to deny the catch to Americans, thus contributing to devastate the
west coast salmon shery.
The Canada-US dispute provides an example of the dangers of competition in common-
access sheries in the presence of poor enforcement of cooperative agreements and uncertainty
10Munro also examines di¤erences in shing e¤ort costs and consumer preferences as a potential source of
conicts in resource management.
10
about stock levels. Unfortunately, little can be done to alleviate the impact of the stock level
uncertainty on the long-term shery management. However, we can circumvent the problems of
monitoring and enforcement, sometimes excessively costly or impossible, and ensure the future
viability of sh stocks, or, for that matter, any other renewable natural resource, by relying on
a self-enforcing contract of the type modeled in sections 2 and 3 above.
In order to evaluate the positions of Canada and the United States in potential treaties, we
need to establish whether the two countries have identical non-cooperative payo¤s and, if not,
which country has an advantage.11 For example, since Canada and the United States are likely
to have the same discount factor, we are able to conclude that the country with the higher
no-agreement payo¤ will have to receive more than fty percent of the allowable catch in the
present as well as in the future. On the other hand, if neither of them has an advantage, they
will always share the harvest equally. In the salmon case, we know that Americans catch some
of the Canada-spawned sh (mainly pinks and sockeye) as they pass through American waters,
and, similarly, Canadians catch some of the US-spawned sh (mainly cohos and chinooks) as
they pass through Canadian waters. Of the four named salmon species, sockeye and chinooks
are economically the most valuable. Now, as sockeye is the most important salmon to the British
Columbia shing industry, Canada will probably have more to lose than the United States under
non-cooperation, and this can be considered to imply a higher no-agreement payo¤ to the United
States, in which case our model predicts a larger harvest share of sockeye to the United States
than to Canada under cooperation in the present and the future. Similarly, given that chinooks
11Munro and Stokes (1989) point out that the salmon dispute is not simply between Canada and the United
States, as there is considerable antagonism between Washington, Oregon and Alaska. However, if we assume
that the United States can solve their internal conicts by a self-enforcing division of their national quota, then
Canada will have to negotiate only with the United States as a whole.
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are the most important salmon species marketed by Americans, we expect Canada to always
have a larger cooperative harvest share of chinooks.
The other current conict which we can analyze in the context of the above model is that
between Canada and the European Union over turbot,12 a member of the ounder family, which
is primarily used for sh sticks in North America and smoked in Europe. The dispute concerns
the area of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland outside the two hundred nautical mile limit of
Canada,13 where European (Spanish and Portuguese) vessels have been shing above the quota
set for the European Union, historically below fty percent, by the fteen-country North Atlantic
Fishery Organization (NAFO).14 To justify overshing, the European Union has cited the low
Canadian share of the turbot caught over recent years, around twenty percent, as an indication of
excessively high, over sixty percent, NAFO shares for Canada. In contrast, Canada has claimed
that its low catch share has been the immediate consequence of the continued overshing by the
European Union and other NAFO members.
If Canada and the European Union have the same attitude towards the future, that is, if they
have the same discount factor, and if Canada, being the Home country, has a better position
under non-cooperation, we nd that our model supports NAFOs decision to assign Canada a
harvest share continually greater than fty percent. However, many, and the Canadian Fisheries
Minister Brian Tobin himself, have argued that Canada is signicantly more conservationist
than the European Union. In support of this argument, European interest rates, which can be
regarded as a proxy for discount rates, have been traditionally higher than Canadian interest
12 It must be noted that the model of sections 2 and 3 is applicable to straddling stockmanagement when
there are only two countries involved, as otherwise competition on the high seas will disrupt the duopolistic
equilibrium. While countries other than Canada and the European Union do sh for turbot, none are signicant
as these two countries.
13The area is commonly known as the nose and tail of the Grand Banks.
14 In 1995, the quota set for the EU by NAFO was 3,400 tonnes, or 12.6% of the total allowable catch.
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rates, implying a lower discount factor for the European Union, and thus a greater future-
orientation for Canada. Under these conditions, our model predicts a larger cooperative harvest
share in the present for the European Union if the e¤ect of di¤ering discount factors outweighs
that of di¤ering no-agreement payo¤s. Formally, the European Union is to receive a higher share
in the present if
1
2
(bH   bF )[p  C(x1)]h2 > (V 0  W 0)  1
2
(bH + bF )(v   w); (4.1)
that is, if the average discounted second-period net benet from the Home countrys higher
discount factor is greater than the average perceived value of the rst-period no-agreement
payo¤ di¤erential,15 or, under the assumption of constant default payo¤s for both countries and
by (2.3), if
bH   bF > [a2(v   w)  (1  a2)(v   w)]
[(1  a2)v   a2w] : (4.2)
This seems to be the case; in fact, in September 1995, Canada and the European Union succeeded
in reaching an agreement with NAFO, whereby the European Union is entitled to fty-ve
percent of the 1996 total allowable catch.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have suggested that countries involved in conicts over transboundary sh
stocks may not enjoy equal default (breakdown) positions, and, consequently, may not share
15The right-hand-side of (4.1) is the di¤erence between the present value of the two-period no-agreement payo¤
di¤erential (V0 W0) and the second-period non-cooperative payo¤ di¤erential discounted by the average discount
factor.
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the joint-harvest equally, even if they have identical shing costs and social discount factors.
Di¤ering no-agreement payo¤s may arise from the Home countrys geographic proximity to the
sh stock which confers the advantage of more diverse technologies. In fact, the Home country
has the option to separate the harvesting of the sh from the processing operation, a luxury the
Foreign country does not possess.
Our model, however, is not limited to situations where countries are equally future-oriented.
For example, in the turbot conict between Canada, possibly more conservationist, and the
European Union, our analysis is able to explain recent developments, according to which the
European Union is to receive a harvest share greater than fty percent in 1996. Whether or not
a less conservationist Foreign country gets more than half of the total allowable catch depends
on the magnitude of the e¤ect of the discount factor di¤erential (bH   bF ) relative to that of the
non-cooperative payo¤ di¤erential (V 0  W 0). Specically, a more substantial discount factor
di¤erential, implying a more sizable disparity in the two countriespreferences for conservation,
signies a larger current harvest share for the less conservationist country; on the other hand, a
more advantageous position of the more future-oriented country, implying a greater breakdown
payo¤ di¤erential, leads to a smaller current harvest share for the less conservationist country.
In the light of the September 1995 settlement between Canada and the European Union, our
model suggests that Canada is, as claimed, much more conservationist or future-oriented than
the European Union, and thus agreed to a share less than fty percent for 1996, despite its
better default position.
Notwithstanding its simplicity, our model does provide notable insights into the real world
international management a¤airs where cooperation is the norm and conicts are a transitory
and often short-lived phenomenon. In fact, the analysis performed above is not only applicable
14
to shery management but also to any other renewable natural resource which happens to be
jointly exploited by two countries.
* Comments by Charles Plourde and two anonymous referees are greatly appreciated.
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